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“Error But Without Malice” in Defamation of Public Officials:
The Value of Free Expression in International Human Rights Law
Edward L. Carter, Professor of Communications
Brigham Young University
Government officials in various parts of the world use defamation to silence critics,
but defamation liability may curtail freedom of expression on topics of public interest and
undermine human rights generally. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights guarantees freedom of expression unless a state can show need to protect
individual reputation and acts proportionally. In its adjudication of complaints for
violations of Article 19, and in its General Comment 34, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee has crafted the principle that defamation liability may not be imposed if an
erroneous statement about a public official was made in “error but without malice.”
Although soft law, General Comment 34 represents the Committee’s most compelling
articulation of the values animating freedom of expression in international human rights
law, and chief among the values is the role played by free expression to promote realization
of all human rights.
After Angolan journalist Rafael Marques de Morais accused the nation’s autocratic
president of corruption in three newspaper articles in 1999, Marques was arrested at
gunpoint, jailed for 40 days and tried for criminal defamation.1 Marques was convicted of
criminal defamation and another crime under Angolan law called abuse of the press based
on “offensive words and expressions” against President José Eduardo dos Santos.2 A judge
ordered Marques to pay a fine and spend six months in prison; although the prison time was
suspended, authorities prevented Marques from leaving the country for a time. The judge
also ordered Marques’ lawyer disbarred after the lawyer protested the judge’s decision not
to allow presentation of evidence that Marques made the accusations against dos Santos in
good faith, believing them to be true.3
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Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola (Communication No. 1128/2002), ¶¶ 2.1-2.10, UN Doc
CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (2005).
2
Id. at ¶ 2.10.
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Id. at ¶¶ 2.8-2.10.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Angola reversed the criminal defamation
conviction but affirmed the abuse of press conviction notwithstanding the freedom of
expression provision in the nation’s Constitution.4 The Supreme Court concluded Marques
had harmed dos Santos’ rights to honor and reputation and had failed to give him due
respect as President.5 Marques submitted a complaint to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, which concluded that Angola violated Marques’ freedom of expression right
under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter
“ICCPR”). Among other things, the Committee stated that dos Santos is “a public figure
who, as such, is subject to criticism and opposition.”6
However, although Angola bound itself to the provisions of ICCPR by acceding to
the treaty in 1992 with no reservations,7 the country seems not to have fully complied with
the Human Rights Committee decision. Angola did pass a law in 2010 purporting to
guarantee free expression, but the country continued to prosecute and imprison journalists
who reported accusations against dos Santos and other government officials. In 2014 seven
Angolan military generals and their fellow diamond-mining company board members
brought claims against Marques for defamation.8 The charges stemmed from Marques’
2011 book Blood Diamonds: Torture and Corruption in Angola, in which he asserted that
the Angolan military and a private security firm tortured hundreds of people, killing 100, in
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Id. at ¶ 2.12.
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Id. at ¶ 6.8.
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United Nations, Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&lang=en (last visited
March 31, 2015).
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Anonymous, Trial of Rafael Marques de Morais to begin on December 15, MAKAANGOLA.ORG (December
8, 2014), http://makaangola.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11507:trial-of-rafaelmarques-de-morais-to-begin-on-15-december&catid=28:direitos-humanos&Itemid=230&lang=en (last visited
December 15, 2014).
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a single 18-month period in the country’s diamond-mining district.9 Marques faced eight
counts of criminal libel based on his demands for criminal investigation of the generals’
conduct.10 Then, in 2015, prosecutors added 15 new defamation charges against Marques.11
Ultimately the judge ordered Marques to cease distribution of his book and gave him a sixmonth suspended jail sentence.12
Marques’ case is not the only one in which a government critic has faced charges of
defamation brought by government officials.13 But given Marques’ accusations of
government-backed torture and murder, his case illustrates particularly well the role played
by free expression to promote all human rights. Former UN Human Rights Committee
member and Professor Michael O’Flaherty has stated that criminal defamation laws in 160
nations represent a threat to freedom of expression, which he called “essential to the good
working of the entire human rights system.”14 International human rights law attempts to
balance freedom of expression with other values, including individual dignity and
reputation, public order, non-discrimination and respect for religious identity. Yet even so,
curtailing free expression may not serve the interest of human rights generally.
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The Human Rights Committee took a significant step in 2011 when it published
General Comment 34 on Article 19. General Comments are not binding international law
but they do provide important guidance and interpretation. General Comment 34 articulates
the values behind freedom of expression in international human rights law, and the
dominant value is to promote realization of all other human rights. In General Comment
34, the Committee expressed its view that Article 19 prohibits nations that are parties to
ICCPR from imposing defamation liability for erroneous statements about public officials
made without malice.15 For an American audience familiar with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,16 it is important to note that the Human Rights Committee’s rule may appear
related to actual malice but the Committee neither used that phrase nor invoked Sullivan
directly.
This article first traces the development of free expression, including limitations for
protection of reputation, in the drafting history or travaux préparatoires of ICCPR’s Article
19. In tracing that development, the article focuses on articulation of the values of free
expression. The article then explains the role and importance of the Human Rights
Committee as the treaty body within the UN system to monitor and ensure compliance with
ICCPR. Among the Committee’s tools are General Comments and jurisdiction to resolve
individual complaints stemming from nations—referred to as “states parties”—that have
signed and ratified ICCPR. The article then analyzes the Committee’s recent expanded
articulation of free-speech values, as well as the standard for the fault element of
defamation, in General Comment 34 and individual complaint resolutions.

15
16

UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, ¶ 47 (2011) [hereinafter GC 34].
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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The article concludes that the free-speech values of ICCPR’s Article 19 are unique
to international human rights law, as is the “error but without malice” standard of General
Comment 34. Although the Article 19 freedom of expression right is not the same as
freedom of expression under the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment or any other
particular national standard, the Article 19 right—as explained and strengthened by General
Comment 34 and recent Human Rights Committee decisions—is nonetheless critical to the
international human rights law enterprise. The Article 19 right deserves respect and
adherence by the 168 states parties to ICCPR, and particular attention should be paid to
how free expression serves the purposes of international human rights law generally.
DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ARTICLE 19 ICCPR
In the context of the U.S. First Amendment, scholars and jurists have highlighted
the role played by free expression to enable the search for truth in a hypothetical
marketplace of ideas,17 facilitate self-governance in a democratic society,18 serve as a
counter-majoritarian check on the abuse of power by the government or other forces,19
promote tolerance,20 create a safety valve that fosters societal stability21 and allow
individuals to exercise autonomy and experience self-realization.22 These values were
canonized in Justice William J. Brennan’s opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court majority in
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Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J, dissenting)
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256 (1961).
19
See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527
(1977).
20
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 120 (1988).
21
See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
22
See David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
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Sullivan.23 Yet these are not the only possible free-expression values, as evidenced in the
development of international human rights law.
One of the first goals of the United Nations after its establishment in 1945 was
creation of a comprehensive statement of fundamental human rights. The UN Economic
and Social Council adopted a resolution in 1946 that authorized the UN Commission on
Human Rights to draft an International Bill of Rights.24 It is clear that freedom of
expression was prominently contemplated because the Commission on Human Rights was
empowered to constitute a Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press.25
Eventually, a Drafting Committee for the International Bill of Rights was formed, and that
group studied then-existing freedom of expression provisions of numerous nations as well
as proposals by non-government organizations (NGOs).
The Drafting Committee in 1947 proposed a three-part free expression right. First,
Article 15 of the proposed International Bill of Rights contained an absolute right regarding
opinion: “Everyone has the right to form, to hold, to receive and to impart opinions.”26
Second, Article 16 addressed freedom of information: “There shall be free and equal access
to all sources of information both within and beyond the borders of the State.”27 Third,
Article 17 proposed a limited right that seemed to focus on mass media expression:
“Subject only to the laws governing slander and libel, there shall be freedom of speech and
of expression by any means whatsoever, and there shall be reasonable access to all channels

23

376 U.S. at 269 (citations omitted).
UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 9(II), 2 nd Session (June 21, 1946),
http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1946_2nd_esc.shtml (last visited March 30, 2016).
25
Id.
26
UN Commission on Human Rights, Drafting Committee, Draft Outline of International Bill of Rights,
E/CN.4/AC.1/3 (June 4, 1947), at 6, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/AC.1/3
(last visited March 30, 2016).
27
Id.
24
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of communication. Censorship shall not be permitted.”28 A fourth provision, in Article 18,
did not specify a right but rather a responsibility: “There exists a duty towards society to
present information and news in a fair and impartial manner.”29
The Drafting Committee noted language from various national constitutions, among
other sources, that explained rationales for freedom of expression.30 While many of the
national provisions contained straightforward statements of the right without explanation,
others explicitly discussed the values behind freedom of expression. For example, language
from Liberia invoked the idea that “liberty of the press is essential to the security of
freedom in a state.”31 A provision from Norway specifically protected expression “on the
administration of the State….”32 In addition, a submission by a U.S.-based NGO
emphasized that “[f]reedom of expression and association is vital to the preservation of the
basic liberties….” and that all human rights could have “tangible meaning and practical
application” only if government did not unduly censor communication.33
By the time the Drafting Committee made another report to the Commission on
Human Rights in mid-1948, the Committee had considered a long list of restrictions on free
expression that were proposed during the May 1948 UN Conference on Freedom of
Information in Geneva. Conference participants suggested, among others, a limitation be
imposed on freedom of expression for defamation but only if the defamatory statements did

28

Id.
Id.
30
Drafting Committee of Human Rights Commission, International Bill of Rights Documented Outline Part 1
(June 11, 1947), E/CN.4/AC.1/3/ADD.1, at 117-136,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1 (last visited March 30, 2016).
31
Id. at 129.
32
Id. at 132.
33
Id. at 135-36.
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not benefit the public.34 Around this same time the Drafting Committee considered
language from the Soviet Union that freedom of expression should be protected “[i]n
accordance with the principles of democracy and in the interests of strengthening
international co-operation and world peace. . . .”35
Ultimately the Drafting Committee’s work led to adoption of both Article 19 in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 in ICCPR. When the UDHR was
adopted on December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly opted for a straightforward
statement of the right to free expression in a single article that contained no elaboration of
either underlying values or restrictions: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”36
The Universal Declaration, though, was not a treaty and thus had no binding force.
Therefore, even after 1948 progress continued toward a draft International Covenant on
Human Rights. By 1950, the draft free expression provision for the International Covenant
left off the language about defamation and other exceptions and instead simply stated that
limitations on freedom of expression must be “provided by law and necessary . . . for the
protection of the rights, reputation or freedoms of other persons.”37 Two years later, the
language was altered slightly to say that the limitation must be “provided by law and . . .
strictly necessary, in a democratic society . . . for the respect of the rights and reputations of

34

UN Drafting Committee of Commission on Human Rights, Second Session, Report (May 21, 1948),
E/CN.4/95, at 31, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/95 (last visited March 30,
2016).
35
Id. at 30.
36
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, UNGA Res. 217 A(III).
37
MARC J BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE ‘TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES’ OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 388 (1987).
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others. . . .”38 The same year, 1952, the Commission on Human Rights eliminated
reference to a democratic society.39 By 1961, the UN General Assembly had crafted the
final language of the free expression provision, and it officially became Article 19 of
ICCPR when that Covenant was adopted on December 16, 1966:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and
are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals.40
The content of the third paragraph of Article 19 was debated in the Commission on
Human Rights for several years. One side argued that specifying duties and responsibilities
of individuals was not the purpose of an international agreement on civil and political rights
and therefore should not be included.41 However, that argument did not prevail in light of
the counter-argument that the effect of modern media expression would be so great that an
emphasis on duties and responsibilities was needed.42
In summary, the travaux préparatoires of Article 19 ICCPR illustrate that drafters
considered freedom of expression to serve various values in society but primary among
those was to ensure other human rights and facilitate the functioning of the human-rights

38

Id. at 389-390.
Id. at 401.
40
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
41
BOSSUYT, supra note 37 at 386.
42
Id. at 386-87.
39
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system. Although the final version of Article 19 ICCPR omitted explicit reference to the
public interest in allowing certain defamations of public officials, the provision does require
that any restriction on freedom of expression for defamation be “provided by law” and
“necessary.”43 This test aims ensures that the means employed by government are
proportional to the goal sought. Therefore, Article 19 requires that any limitation on
freedom of expression actually be effective to achieve the state’s objective and be no more
broad than necessary.
Today, ICCPR is the most prominent of nine international human rights law treaties
administered by the United Nations. The other treaties are the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the
International Convention on the Protection of All Rights of Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families; the International Convention for Protection of All Persons From
Enforced Disappearance; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities.
The remainder of this article discusses how Article 19 of ICCPR, the freeexpression provision, has become the linchpin for human rights contained not only in
ICCPR but in the other international human-rights law treaties as well. It is important to
note that ICCPR has 168 states parties (i.e. nations that have both signed and ratified the
treaty), and it is one of only three of the UN human-rights treaties—along with the treaties
on racial discrimination and torture, respectively—that has been both signed and ratified by

43

ICCPR art. 19.
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the United States.44 Enforcement of each of the human-rights treaties mentioned above is
overseen by a treaty body that issues regular reports about compliance by individual states
parties and also adjudicates complaints of violations of treaty provisions. This article next
turns to the role of the UN Human Rights Committee in defining the meaning of Article 19
of ICCPR.
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 19 BY THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE
As the treaty body charged with monitoring implementation of international humanrights law standards set forth in ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee (not to be confused
with the policy-making UN Commission on Human Rights, now called the Human Rights
Council) is called upon to interpret ICCPR, including Article 19. The Committee examines
state reports and makes concluding observations that focus on freedom of expression,
among other rights. In its jurisprudential role, the Committee hears disputes and makes
determinations about whether states have violated rights guaranteed by Article 19.45 The
Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies are designed to be independent, which
allows them to engage in vigorous scrutiny and to “contribute to the progressive
development of international human rights law through authoritative interpretations of
treaty provisions or advice to all stakeholders on thematic matters.”46

44

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard,
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited March 30, 2016).
45
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights
Committee (May 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf (last visited
March 31, 2015).
46
Navi Pillay and Claudio Grossman, The International Human Rights Treaty System: Impact at the Domestic
and International Levels, 21(1) HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF 32 (2014) (interview of Claudio Grossman by Megan
Wakefield).
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The Human Rights Committee is made up of 18 experts who meet three times per
year to consider state reports, issue concluding observations and also adjudicate
individuals’ complaints against nations that have signed ICCPR but are alleged to have
violated its provisions. The Committee does have authority to monitor compliance with
ICCPR and yet the Committee is not a judicial body and its members are not empowered to
make international law. Whether the Committee’s interpretations of ICCPR are
authoritative is subject to debate, and while the Committee fills a quasi-judicial function,
much of its work might best be considered “soft” international law.47
Still, the Human Rights Committee develops persuasive international human rights
standards and provides thematic guidance through formulation and distribution of General
Comments. General Comments may focus on a particular provision of ICCPR. The
Human Rights Committee’s practice of issuing General Comments dates to the early 1980s
and stems from a charge given in Article 40(4) ICCPR. At first, General Comments were
perceived as “essentially procedural and descriptive and therefore rather innocuous in
character.”48 But as the role of the Human Rights Committee and other UN treaty bodies
has evolved from mere expert monitoring to quasi-administrative and even quasi-judicial,
the role of General Comments has changed too.49 The Committee itself describes a General
Comment as capturing “the Committee’s conceptual understanding of the content of a

H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 242 (2004) (“A term
describing a doctrine of international law that describes the legal status of certain human rights related
declarations, resolutions, guidelines, and basic principles. They are created . . . as nonbinding norms, setting
forth nonobligatory but highly recommended standards of state conduct that should be followed.”).
48
Paula Gerber, Joanna Kyriakakis & Katie O’Byrne, General Comment 16 on State Obligations Regarding
the Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights: What Is Its Standing, Meaning and Effect?, 14
MELBOURNE J. OF INTL. L. 93, 99 (2013).
49
UN Office of the High Commissioner, supra note 45 at 24-25.
47
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particular provision, and as such is a very useful guide to the normative substance of
international human rights obligations.”50
Although not binding, General Comments nonetheless have political, moral and
even some legal weight.51 Their legal weight takes two forms: first, they may be
considered, in some contexts, authoritative legal interpretations that states parties should
comply with in good faith; second, General Comments are aspirational declarations of best
practices—not necessarily restatements of what the law is but rather articulations of what it
should be.52 Thus the power of General Comments lies in their normative statements,
which are both informed by and reinforced through the Human Rights Committee’s
concluding observations on state reports and the Committee’s jurisprudence.53
General Comment 10 and Early Interpretations of Article 19
When the Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment 10 in 1983, it made
some superficial observations about Article 19 but details were “very scant.”54 The
Committee did not address defamation explicitly, and it said with regard to limitations on
freedom of expression only that the state “may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”55
General Comment 10 is only a page long and it did not specifically mention a right to
criticize public officials.
Still, in a relatively early case under the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee
concluded that Uruguay violated the Article 19 rights of two citizens by imprisoning and

50

Id. at 24.
Gerber et al., supra note 48 at 99-100.
52
Id. at 100-102; CONDÉ, supra note 47 at 96-97.
53
UN Office of the High Commissioner, supra note 45 at 24-25.
54
O’Flaherty, supra note 14 at 636.
55
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 10: Freedom of expression, 29/06/1983.
51
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torturing them in the 1970s for “subversive” political activities.56 Although Uruguay
argued the Committee’s airing of the allegations constituted defamation of the nation’s
character, the Committee concluded that both citizens and the international human-rights
law system were entitled to scrutinize the conduct of government authorities.57 In 1992,
about a decade after adoption of General Comment 10, the Committee held that the Article
17 ICCPR reputation and honor rights of the former director general of Peruvian
penitentiaries were not violated when newspapers and presidential campaign candidates
accused him of corruption.58
In 1996 the Committee endorsed citizens’ right to critique their government leaders.
After examining claims by three Togolese men that they were jailed and their salaries
docked for reading and sharing criticisms of the government, the Committee observed that
“citizens must be allowed to inform themselves about alternatives to the political
system/parties in power, and that they may criticize or openly and publicly evaluate their
Governments without fear or interference or punishment. . . .”59 Togo was found in
violation of Article 19. The Committee decided in 2004 that a Sri Lankan journalist
charged with defaming government ministers and police officials was entitled to remedies
under Article 19 because Sri Lanka had repeatedly indicted the journalist and left some of
the charges pending for years.60

56

Ann Maria Garcia Lanza de Netto v. Uruguay, Communication 8/1977, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 45
(1984).
57
Id. at ¶ 16 (faulting the government of Uruguay for failing to provide evidence of the citizens’ alleged
subversive political activities).
58
González del Río v. Peru, Communication 263/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987 (1992).
59
Adimayo M Aduayom, Sofianou T Diasso and Yawo S Dobou v. Togo, Communications 422/1990,
423/1990 and 424/1990, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990 (1996).
60
Victor Ivan Majuwana Kankanamge v. Sri Lanka, Communication 909/2000, UN Doc
CCPR/C/81/D/909/2000 (2004).

14

In one of its most detailed analyses of the Article 19(3) standard for restricting
freedom of expression, the Committee in 2006 concluded that Serbia and Montenegro did
not have sufficient justification for convicting a journalist of criminal insult.61 The
journalist had accused a Socialist Party leader of corruption, and the Committee took
particular note of the leader’s public official status. The Committee said in Bodrožić v.
Serbia and Montenegro that “in circumstances of public debate in a democratic society,
especially in the media, concerning figures in the political domain, the value placed by the
Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high.”62 Thus the Committee
suggested there is not a necessity, under Article 19(3), to protect the rights or reputations of
public officials when the accusations leveled against them have a good-faith basis.
Even when it is unclear whether accusations against government officials have a
good-faith basis, the Human Rights Committee has emphasized that the burden is on the
state to prove restrictions on freedom of expression are necessary. In the case of a member
of the Sri Lankan Parliament sentenced to two years of hard labor in prison for questioning
the independence and integrity of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court, the Committee found a
violation of Article 19.63 Although Sri Lanka argued the contempt conviction was
necessary to protect the reputation of the court, the Committee stated that the need to
maintain orderly court proceedings does not justify a court in insulating itself from all
criticism. In this particular case, the state had no way to prove the falsity of the

Mr Zeljko Bodrožić v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication 1180/2003, UN Doc
CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003 (2006).
62
Id. at ¶ 7.2.
63
Dissanayake, Mudiyanselage Sumanaweera Banda v. Sri Lanka, Communication 1373/2005, UN Doc
CCPR/C/93/D/1373/2005 (2008).
61
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parliamentarian’s statement, which was that the court might issue a “disgraceful decision”
in a pending case.64
Contemporaneous with its decision in the Sri Lankan case, the Human Rights
Committee in 2008 advised the United Kingdom, in concluding observations to a state
report, to consider adopting a higher standard of fault for defamation.65 The Committee
said it was concerned the UK’s defamation law as it stood in 2008 “has served to
discourage media reporting on matters of serious public interest. . . .”66 Therefore, the
Committee said, the UK should “require[e] proof by the plaintiff of actual malice in order
to go forward on actions concerning reporting on public officials and prominent public
figures. . . .”67 Although the Committee did not reference the U.S. Supreme Court, the
phrase “actual malice” obviously refers to Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Sullivan,
which required that government officials suing for defamation prove that false statements
were made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.68 The Committee’s
jurisprudence prior to General Comment 34 demonstrated protectiveness for criticisms of
public officials but lacked an explicit standard by which to measure the permissibility of
those critiques when they included defamatory statements.
General Comment 34

64

Id. at ¶ 8.3.
Human Rights Committee, 93rd Session, Concluding Observations to report of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (July 30, 2008), CCPR/C?GBR/CO/6 at ¶ 25,
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsg%2FOK3H8q
ae8NhIDi53MecK%2F2gqd4WjxGafXAOvi2gd8MGnqbt1avQnaNolUy2XcvBwJ5RjyX8HLStgrG3Gvb212
L1D8aWEhetjn9vv7zgmO (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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In 2009, the Human Rights Committee determined to replace General Comment 10
with a new interpretation of Article 19, and the Committee appointed O’Flaherty, who
served on the Human Rights Committee from 2004 to 2012, as rapporteur.69 O’Flaherty
later described four sources he used in creating the initial draft: General Comment 10; other
relevant General Comments by the Committee; the Committee’s jurisprudence; and
Concluding Observations on state reports.70 O’Flaherty further explained that General
Comment 34 is organized thematically but does not track the format of Article 19 itself,
particularly when it comes to the grounds for restriction in Article 19(3).71
Compared to the one page of General Comment 10, the Committee’s General
Comment 34 reaches to 13 pages. By the time General Comment 34 was published in
2011, the Committee’s use of General Comments had evolved to the point that each was
considered “authoritative legal analysis of the provisions of the treaty”72 and “an
autonomous and distinct juridical instrument.”73 During the drafting of General Comment
34, states parties, scholars, NGOs and special rapporteurs submitted approximately 350
proposals.74
A few scholars previously have analyzed General Comment 34.75 Michael
O’Flaherty’s work is particularly valuable given that he was the rapporteur selected by the
Human Rights Committee in 2009 to draft the text. O’Flaherty detailed the drafting
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process, providing insights about the meaning of the General Comment.76 One American
scholar has suggested General Comment 34 established a binding international-law basis
for freedom of access to government-held information.77 Other commentators have treated
General Comment 34 as an interpretation of Article 19 that should be heeded but that may
be supplemented with other interpretive devices.78
Much of the scholarly attention on General Comment 34 has been in the context of
blasphemy laws. An American law student called General Comment 34 a
“reinterpretation” of Article 19 that left the door open too wide for blasphemy laws, even
while the same author praised General Comment 34 for advocating protection of some false
speech as non-defamatory.79 In the context of blasphemy laws, General Comment 34 has
been called a “formal statement” of international human rights law.80 In the area of
protections for mass media and those accused of defamation, too, scholars have given
weight to General Comment 34 and found its provisions worthy of analysis for their
normative importance.81
In an early version of the General Comment presented to the Committee in January
2010, O’Flaherty referred to General Comment 25: Participation in Public Affairs and the
Right to Vote.82 In a subsequent draft of June 2010, the General Comment 34 again
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included the reference to participation in public affairs and voting but added the following
language that was eventually adopted in the final version: “The free communication of
information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and
elected representatives is essential. This implies a free press and other media able to
comment on public issues without censorship or restraint and to inform public opinion.”83
In this matter, General Comment 34 evokes the early work by the Drafting
Committee of the Human Rights Commission in 1947. Both the early documents and
General Comment 34 endorse the concept that freedom of expression in a democratic
society facilitates accountability of political leaders. The early draft of General Comment
34 specifically addressed political discourse and public debate about the performance of
political figures. In this case, “the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited
expression is particularly high.”84 For this proposition, the January 2010 draft cited the
Committee’s 2006 decision in the Bodrožić v. Serbia and Montenegro case, which held that
a journalist was protected by freedom of expression in accusing a Socialist Party leader of
corruption. The reference to Bodrožić was preserved in subsequent drafts, including the
final version. However, the language surrounding this citation was changed somewhat
between the January 2010 and later versions.
The January 2010 draft, after citing Bodrožić, observed that mere insult to a public
figure should not be legally actionable.85 Later versions, including the final draft, retained
this statement but added the truism that “public figures benefit from the provisions of the
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Covenant,” without elaborating.86 This addition could be seen as the Committee hedging
somewhat on its commitment to freedom of expression, though in reality it only
acknowledges the obvious fact that freedom of expression—even about public officials—is
not absolute and may be curtailed under certain circumstances that are necessary and
established by law, something Article 19(3) already makes clear.
In other ways, the Committee strengthened its statement of support for freedom of
expression in the drafting process of General Comment 34. The January 2010 draft stated
that “public figures, including heads of state, are legitimately subject to criticism and
political opposition.”87 As support for this statement, the draft cited the Committee’s 2005
decision in favor of the Angolan journalist Marques, who accused the country’s president of
corruption and was charged with failing to duly respect the leader. In subsequent versions
of General Comment 34, the reference to Marques was retained but the language
accompanying the reference was changed slightly to read, “Moreover, all public figures,
including those exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state and
government, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.”88
In adding the word “all,” the Committee seems to have desired to strengthen its
statement about political leaders being subject to criticism. The word “all,” in conjunction
with addition of the phrase “those exercising the highest political authority,” suggests a
desire by the Committee to emphasize that no high political leader, regardless of the
authority granted him or her, is exempt from opposition and critique. At the same time,
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“all” suggests that even low-level and local government leaders should expect their
performance to be scrutinized and publicly debated. In both the early and later versions of
General Comment 34, O’Flaherty noted the Committee’s jurisprudence disfavoring “lese
majesty, desacato, disrespect for authority, disrespect for flags and symbols, defamation of
the head of state and the protection of the honour of public officials. . . .”89
The early draft of General Comment 34 included a paragraph warning that
defamation laws should “comply with the test of necessity in paragraph 3” of Article 19 so
they would not “stifle freedom of expression.”90 Between January 2010 and November
2010, this sentence was altered slightly to say that defamation laws should “comply with
paragraph 3” of Article 19, thus recognizing that restrictions on freedom of expression for
defamation must not only be necessary in a democratic society but also must be stated in
law.91 The broad reference to Article 19(3), in place of a specific mention of the test of
necessity, also implicates the statement in Article 19(3) that exercise of the right to freedom
of expression “carries with it special duties and responsibilities.” Both early and later drafts
emphasized that truth must be allowed as a defense to defamation, and that defamation
liability should not be allowed for statements of opinion that are not capable of objective
verification.92
The key provision of General Comment 34, at least with respect to the fault
requirement for defamatory statements about public officials, also underwent revision
between the January 2010 and November 2010 versions. By November 2010, the language
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had evolved in favor of freedom of expression: “At least with regard to comments about
public figures, consideration should be given to avoiding penalising or otherwise rendering
unlawful untrue statements that have been published in error but without malice. In any
event, a public interest in the subject matter of the criticism should be recognized as a
defence.”93 In both drafts, a citation was made to the Committee’s concluding observations
in the 2008 UK state report, in which the Committee recommended that the UK adopt the
actual malice rule.
Although both the January 2010 and November 2010 versions of General Comment
34 stated only that states should give consideration to protecting erroneous statements made
without malice, the November 2010 draft added the stronger statement that regardless
whether a state adopts error but without malice as a standard, public interest should be a
defense to defamation liability.94 Although public interest is not the same as error but
without malice, it could function in much the same way, at least with respect to statements
about the performance of government officials in their duties. Although the Committee did
not state that a public interest defense was required by Article 19, General Comment 34
does say public interest “should” be a defense.95 Meanwhile, with respect to error but
without malice, the Committee said only that “consideration should be given” to adopting
the rule.96
It bears repeating that General Comment 34 does not use the phrase “actual malice.”
But paragraph 47 of the final version of General Comment 34 does cite to the Committee’s
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2008 concluding observations in the UK state report, and in those concluding observations
the Committee did use the phrase “actual malice.” The language the Committee used in
General Comment 34 evokes the actual malice standard when it says states should consider
protecting from defamation liability those “untrue statements that have been published in
error but without malice.”97 Still, it is apparent that actual malice and error but without
malice are not the same thing.
The early and later drafts of General Comment 34 differed in another significant
way relating to defamation. The January 2010 version stated that criminalization of
defamation “should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases” and that
“imprisonment will rarely, if ever, constitute an appropriate penalty.”98 By November
2010, however, the final language had been adopted, and this was that “imprisonment is
never an appropriate penalty.”99
THE VALUES OF FREE EXPRESSION IN GENERAL COMMENT 34 AND
SUBSEQUENT JURISPRUDENCE
General Comment 34 reflects the values of freedom of expression. For example,
General Comment 34 places “particularly high” value on “uninhibited expression” with
respect to debate about political and other public issues.100 Human-rights tribunals have
acknowledged this kind of debate may take place during a political campaign101 but it could
also be in the context of a public discussion about the impact of corporate products on
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health.102 General Comment 34 asserts that, sometimes, insult to public officials is
necessarily protected in order to provide a check on government, allow self-governance and
enable the search for truth.103
Perhaps the greatest contribution of General Comment 34 is its emphasis that
protection of free expression is critical to preserve human rights generally. One of the first
principles articulated in General Comment 34 is that free expression is necessary for
transparency and accountability, which are in turn “essential for the promotion and
protection of human rights.”104 According to the Committee, the “freedoms of opinion and
expression form a basis for the full enjoyment of a wide range of other human rights” such
as voting, assembly and association.105 One of the most important topics of discussion
protected by Article 19 is human rights themselves.106 Although the drafters of General
Comment 34 acknowledged that some limitations could be imposed on free expression in
accordance with Article 19(3), those limitations should never be aimed at limiting the
advocacy of human rights.107 Journalists were singled out for their role in free expression
but so were human-rights workers and judges who enforced human-rights standards.108
Thus, although soft law, General Comment 34 is one of the most significant
statements in international human rights law to define the purpose of free expression under
ICCPR. Free expression in international human rights law not only enables the search for
truth in the marketplace of ideas, facilitates democracy, provides a safety valve and serves
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as a check on government, but it also—and perhaps most importantly—ensures that all
other rights—non-discrimination, food, health, freedom from torture or enforced
disappearance and others—in the nine major human rights treaties can be realized. Here it
is worth recalling the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s much-discussed comment that “a free
press and an active political opposition constitute the best early-warning system a country
threaten [sic] by famines can have. . . .”109
Subsequent to adoption of General Comment 34, the Committee in its resolution of
complaints has cited General Comment 34’s language regarding defamation and thus
indicated its view on how states should apply Article 19. In 2012, the Committee
concluded that the Philippines violated the Article 19 right of a radio broadcaster by
punishing him for saying on the radio that a congressman had an inappropriate relationship
with a married television personality.110 The Philippine trial court had held that the
accusation of adultery amounted to a criminal allegation not related to the congressman’s
official duties and, therefore, was outside the protection of freedom of expression
provisions. However, the Human Rights Committee disagreed with that narrow
interpretation of freedom of expression and held that imprisoning the journalist was not in
line with Article 19. In its decision, the Committee quoted the language from paragraph 47
of General Comment 34 that suggests statements about public officials should not be
punishable if they are made with error but not malice.111
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The journalist received the information about the congressman’s alleged adultery
from three other credible Philippine news organizations, and the journalist attempted to
contact the congressman and the TV personality without success. Under those
circumstances, the journalist had a good-faith belief in the truth of the accusations because
he did not have actual knowledge of their falsity and he did not have specific reason to
believe they might be false. Even if he did not have direct and actual knowledge of the
truth of the statement, the Human Rights Committee concluded that he could not be liable.
In doing so, the Committee explicitly relied on the language from General Comment 34 that
even untrue statements, made without malice and in the public interest, are protected free
expression under Article 19.112
There is evidence that the Philippines may have acted counter to the spirit of the
Human Rights Committee’s decision. The Philippine journalist Adonis’ lawyer, Harry
Roque, decried the country’s 2012 adoption of a Cybercrime Prevention Law which
criminalized defamation and imposed a penalty of 6-12 years imprisonment.113 The Human
Rights Committee seemed to have anticipated this possibility when, in its 2011 decision in
the Adonis case, it warned that the Philippines had voluntarily agreed to the Committee’s
jurisdiction to resolve complaints made under ICCPR.114 Roque argued that the Philippines
was bound under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda to comply with ICCPR, including the
free expression protections in Article 19.115
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In November 2014 the Committee again cited General Comment 34 in holding that
a state—this time Belarus—violated the Article 19 right of a citizen to publicly air
allegations of corruption by elected political leaders.116 In this case, the man applied for a
permit to hold a one-person picket in a pedestrian area but government officials denied his
application, ostensibly on the basis that he would hinder traffic and disrupt public order.
He contended before the Human Rights Committee that the assertions about hindering
traffic and disrupting public order were pretexts and that the real reason for denial of his
application was a desire by public officials to insulate themselves from criticism. The
Committee agreed, recalling the purposes of freedom of expression under Article 19 to
allow “for the full development of the person” and to ensure accountability of political
leaders in a democracy.117 The Committee held that the state had failed to show the
restriction on the man’s freedom of expression was necessary and that the means employed
in imposing the restriction were proportional to the end being served.118
The recent cases from the Philippines and Belarus illustrate the Human Rights
Committee’s commitment to the principle that citizens and journalists are entitled to
criticize public officials. In the Belarus case, no citizen was punished for critical speech but
the Committee made it clear that even preventing a citizen from accessing a forum to air
grievances is in violation of Article 19. These cases demonstrate that the values of free
speech embodied in General Comment 34 are being applied to foster self-governance,
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check on government and to enable other fundamental human rights. The cases analyzed in
this article, beginning with the Human Rights Committee decision in the Uruguay case in
1984, stand for the proposition that the international human rights law system functions best
when scrutiny of public officials is guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
In protecting speech about public officials, public figures and issues of public
concern, the Human Rights Committee has been guided by the requirement in Article 19
that limitations on freedom of expression must be necessary and that the means chosen
must be proportional to a legitimate and substantial end goal.119 Freedom of expression is
vital to self-government, the search for truth, checking government power and allowing
society to adapt and change with minimal violence. Protecting the reputation of
government officials is also a legitimate government purpose, as recognized by General
Comment 34.120 Yet the interest of public officials in being free from insult pales in
comparison to the societal interests facilitated by freedom of expression, a reality also
recognized by General Comment 34.121 The “error but without malice” standard strikes the
balance in favor of freedom of expression.
The need for strong protection for speech about government officials continues in
Angola, as in other states. Rafael Marques de Morais continues to be targeted by Angolan
public officials and other powerful elites who are the subjects of his aggressive
investigative journalism. Given the Human Rights Committee’s previous decision in
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Marques’ favor, and now the additional guidance of General Comment 34, the recent
prosecution and conviction of Marques raises substantial questions about violation of
Article 19. His reporting comes in the context of an issue of public concern, and he has
proven in the past to be thorough and careful in his research. If the military leaders could
prove that he knew the charges were false or he recklessly disregarded their falsity, then
Marques should be liable for defamation. But meeting that high standard of evidentiary
proof is difficult. Short of evidence that he knew the information was false, punishing
Marques is not proportional to the state’s interest.
In future cases involving Marques or other critics of government officials, the
Human Rights Committee could have opportunities to refine its standard for protection of
freedom of expression. Protection for criticisms of public officials was a concern of the
drafters of the UDHR and ICCPR, and it has continued to be a concern of the international
human-rights law system ever since. Through Human Rights Committee jurisprudence and
now General Comment 34, the standard has evolved into one that requires the defamation
proponent to prove the speaker not only spoke in error but did so knowingly. This standard
protects some false speech in the public interest, and the result is a more transparent and
accountable system of government. This protection is, ultimately, a key to the entire human
rights system.
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